We consider a principal-agent model with moral-hazard and asymmetric awareness and show how the heterogeneity of agents on their aversion to effort affects contract design. We discuss the optimal contract adopted when a principal is aware of all the impacts of an agent’s action, while agents ignore some of them. When a principal faces two types of agents, where one type is more effort-averse than the other, the equilibrium contract is shaped by agent proportions: it pools the agents, separates them, or excludes the more effort-averse agents from the contract. When efforts are observable, all the agents remain unaware, while when efforts are hidden, a principal increases the awareness of the agents to a level commensurate with the nature of the contract. JEL Codes – D82; D83; D86

中文翻译：

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非对称意识和异构代理

我们考虑具有道德风险和不对称意识的委托代理模型，并展示代理对努力厌恶的异质性如何影响合同设计。我们讨论当委托人知道代理人行为的所有影响而代理人忽略其中一些影响时采用的最佳契约。当委托人面对两种类型的代理人，其中一种类型的代理人比另一种更厌恶努力时，均衡合同由代理人比例形成：它汇集代理人，将他们分开，或将更厌恶努力的代理人排除在合同之外。当努力可以观察到时，所有的代理人仍然不知道，而当努力被隐藏时，委托人将代理人的意识提高到与合同性质相称的水平。JEL 代码 – D82；D83; D86