Trade unions distort a profit-maximizing firm's input choice. The nature of the resulting inefficiency depends on whether there are wage negotiations or there is efficient bargaining. Moreover, trade unions redistribute income and thereby affect welfare. If firms also pursue Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) objectives, input choices may be distorted already in the absence of collective bargaining. Adopting a positive perspective, we show that CSR objectives, which induce a firm to expand production, have ambiguous wage and employment consequences in case of wage negotiations and raise employment if there is efficient bargaining. Importantly from a normative vantage point, such CSR objectives make a welfare-enhancing role of trade unions more likely in the presence of wage negotiations. The reverse is true in case of efficient bargaining.

中文翻译：

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工会与企业社会责任

工会扭曲了利润最大化企业的投入选择。由此产生的低效率的性质取决于是否有工资谈判或有效率的谈判。此外，工会重新分配收入，从而影响福利。如果公司也追求企业社会责任 (CSR) 目标，在没有集体谈判的情况下，投入选择可能已经被扭曲。采用积极的观点，我们表明，促使企业扩大生产的企业社会责任目标在工资谈判中具有模棱两可的工资和就业后果，如果谈判有效，则可以提高就业率。重要的是，从规范的角度来看，此类企业社会责任目标使得工会在工资谈判中更有可能发挥促进福利的作用。在有效讨价还价的情况下，情况正好相反。