We study taxation by autocratic rulers. Using a detailed dataset on government finances in 105 autocracies from 1950 to 2004, we find that despotic autocrats, who are defined as personally concentrating all decision-making power and as not relying on elites for regime support, tend, with a middle class absent, to use lower personal income taxes in face of a threat of rebellion from the population-at-large and to use higher land and property taxes to financially repress elites. When the threat to the regime is from elites, taxation is the converse, with the tax burden on elites is relaxed. Our empirical results show how autocratic rulers choose forms of taxation with awareness of elites and the population-at-large as groups that can threaten regime security.

我们研究专制统治者的税收。使用1950年至2004年间105个专制国家中政府财政的详细数据集，我们发现专制独裁者倾向于个人集中所有决策权，不依赖精英阶层提供政权支持，而这些中产阶级往往缺乏中产阶级，在面对广大民众的叛乱威胁时使用较低的个人所得税，并使用较高的土地和财产税来经济压制精英阶层。当对政权的威胁来自精英阶层时，征税反过来，而对精英阶层的税收负担得以缓解。我们的经验结果表明，专制统治者如何选择税收形式，同时意识到精英阶层和广大民众，这些群体会威胁政权的安全。