We determine the emergence of the Porter hypothesis in a large oligopoly setting where the industry-wide adoption of green technologies is endogenously determined as a result of competition among coalitions. We examine a framework where firms decide whether to be “brown” or “green” and compete in quantities. We find that the Porter hypothesis may emerge as a market configuration with all green firms spurred by environmental regulation, even if consumers are not environmentally concerned. We also single out the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the green grand coalition is socially optimal and therefore yields a win–win outcome. Then, we show that, if the environmental externality is steep enough, the tax rate maximising welfare in the initial industry configuration is a driver of the win–win solution. Finally, the analysis is extended in several directions.

我们确定了波特假说的出现是在一个大型寡头垄断环境中，由于联盟之间的竞争，内生性地确定了整个行业对绿色技术的采用。我们研究了一个框架，在该框架中，企业决定是“棕色”还是“绿色”并进行数量竞争。我们发现，即使消费者不关心环境，波特假说也可能随着所有绿色企业的市场配置而出现，受到环境法规的刺激。我们还选择了绿色大联盟在社会上处于最佳状态并因此产生双赢结果的必要和充分条件。然后，我们证明，如果环境外部性足够陡峭，则初始行业配置中使福利最大化的税率将是双赢解决方案的驱动力。最后，