当前位置: X-MOL 学术Rationality and Society › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
On the cooperative and competitive aspects of strategic monitoring
Rationality and Society ( IF 0.895 ) Pub Date : 2018-07-12 , DOI: 10.1177/1043463118774785
Daniel G. Arce 1
Affiliation  

Strategic monitoring occurs in myriad situations such as principal–agent relationships, law enforcement and treaty verification. Such situations are generally known as enforcement or inspection games, with the focus largely being on the (counterintuitive) properties of their associated mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. This article instead characterizes the cooperative resolution of the mixed motives of the players involved. It does so through an illustrative decomposition of the enforcement/inspection game into its cooperative and competitive constituent parts. The results are interpreted within an efficiency wage context and the distribution of the saved monitoring costs that cooperation engenders.

中文翻译:

关于战略监督的合作和竞争方面

战略监督发生在无数情况下,例如委托代理关系、执法和条约核查。这种情况通常被称为执法或检查博弈,重点主要是其相关的混合策略纳什均衡的(违反直觉的)属性。相反,本文描述了相关参与者混合动机的合作解决方案。它通过将执法/检查博弈分解为合作和竞争组成部分的说明性分解来实现。结果是在效率工资背景下解释的,以及合作产生的节省的监控成本的分布。
更新日期:2018-07-12
down
wechat
bug