How do principals combine indoctrination and coercion to motivate their agents? Based on previous literature, we argue that indoctrination on the one hand and coercion on the other are substitutes in agent motivation—more of one requires less of the other. But measuring this substitution effect is hard since individuals often self-select into ideological organizations and have incentives to claim insincerely to be ideologically motivated. Using a novel dataset of wartime behavior contained in a large sample of World War II German service records, we present a solution to these problems. We find convincing evidence to support our theory—the German army was able to induce similar effort levels from soldiers who had and had not been in the Hitler Youth, though Hitler Youth alumni required fewer punishments.

中文翻译：

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代理人动机中的灌输和强制：来自纳粹德国的证据

委托人如何结合灌输和强制来激励他们的代理人？根据先前的文献，我们认为一方面灌输和另一方面强制是代理人动机的替代品——更多的一种需要更少的另一种。但是衡量这种替代效应是困难的，因为个人经常自我选择加入意识形态组织，并且有动机不真诚地声称受到意识形态的激励。使用包含在二战德国服役记录的大量样本中的新型战时行为数据集，我们提出了这些问题的解决方案。我们找到了令人信服的证据来支持我们的理论——德国军队能够从参加过和未参加过希特勒青年团的士兵身上诱导出相似的努力水平，尽管希特勒青年团的校友需要较少的惩罚。