Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic processes while utilitarian judgments are typically supported by reflective, conscious processes. However, most of the evidence gathered in support of this model comes from the study of people’s judgments about sacrificial dilemmas, such as Trolley Problems. To which extent does this model generalize to other debates in which deontological and utilitarian judgments conflict, such as the existence of harmless moral violations, the difference between actions and omissions, the extent of our duties of assistance, and the appropriate justification for punishment? To find out, we conducted a series of five studies on the role of reflection in these kinds of moral conundrums. In Study 1, participants were asked to answer under cognitive load. In Study 2, participants had to answer under a strict time constraint. In Studies 3 to 5, we sought to promote reflection through exposure to counter-intuitive reasoning problems or direct instruction. Overall, our results offer strong support to the extension of Greene’s dual-process model to moral debates on the existence of harmless violations and partial support to its extension to moral debates on the extent of our duties of assistance.

在过去的二十年里，道德推理的研究深受约书亚·格林的道德判断双过程模型的影响，根据该模型，道义判断通常由直觉、自动过程支持，而功利判断通常由反思、有意识过程支持. 然而，为支持这一模型而收集的大部分证据来自对人们对牺牲困境的判断的研究，例如电车问题。该模型在多大程度上可以推广到其他道义论和功利论判断冲突的辩论，例如无害的道德违规行为的存在、作为和不作为之间的区别、我们提供帮助的义务的程度以及惩罚的适当理由？要了解，我们对反思在这些道德难题中的作用进行了一系列五项研究。在研究 1 中，参与者被要求在认知负荷下回答。在研究 2 中，参与者必须在严格的时间限制下回答。在研究 3 到 5 中，我们试图通过接触反直觉的推理问题或直接指导来促进反思。总体而言，我们的结果为将格林的双重过程模型扩展到关于存在无害违规行为的道德辩论提供了强有力的支持，并部分支持将其扩展到关于我们的援助义务范围的道德辩论。我们试图通过接触反直觉的推理问题或直接指导来促进反思。总体而言，我们的结果为将格林的双重过程模型扩展到关于存在无害违规行为的道德辩论提供了强有力的支持，并部分支持将其扩展到关于我们的援助义务范围的道德辩论。我们试图通过接触反直觉的推理问题或直接指导来促进反思。总体而言，我们的结果为将格林的双重过程模型扩展到关于存在无害违规行为的道德辩论提供了强有力的支持，并部分支持将其扩展到关于我们的援助义务范围的道德辩论。