We propose a simple model to investigate whether an agent works harder when she is informed of the tasks’ deadlines (i.e., under transparent management) or not (i.e., under opaque management). We do so in a stylized model where; (1) in each period, the agent may work at some cost, rather than shirk at no cost, so as to increase her probability of completing the task, (2) the agent receives an exogenous reward if she completes the task, and (3) at a certain period that the agent knows (transparent management) or not (opaque management), an exogenous deadline will suddenly prevent the agent from working any longer on the task. We find that the agent is strictly more (less) likely to work under opaque than transparent management when the exogenous reward for the task completion is high (low), but not too high (low).

中文翻译：

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截止日期信息的价值；成功的不透明管理

我们提出了一个简单的模型来调查当代理被告知任务的截止日期（即在透明管理下）或没有（即在不透明管理下）时，她是否更努力地工作。我们在一个程式化的模型中这样做；（1）在每个时期，智能体可能会付出一定的代价，而不是无成本地逃避，以增加她完成任务的概率，（2）如果完成任务，智能体会获得外生奖励，并且（ 3）在代理知道（透明管理）或不知道（不透明管理）的某个时间段内，外生的截止日期会突然阻止代理继续执行任务。我们发现，当完成任务的外生奖励高（低）但不太高（低）时，代理在不透明管理下工作的可能性要高（低）。