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A study on online platforms’ price discrimination behavior and the same-side network effects
Kybernetes ( IF 2.5 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-28 , DOI: 10.1108/k-06-2020-0353
Can-Zhong Yao , Yi-Na Mo

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to whether competition between platforms can be effective, thus leading to efficient allocations.

Design/methodology/approach

Based on the classic linear Hoteling model, this paper builds a two-period competition model for two competing platforms using two variants, namely, a discrimination pricing model and a unified pricing model.

Findings

In the case of the discrimination pricing model, the competition is moderate, and the two platforms split the market evenly in the first stage, while both platforms tended to offer preferential treatment to new users and set higher prices for regular customers in the second stage. Compared to the unified pricing model, in the first stage, the platform can provide a higher price that depends on the cross-network effect when it implements discrimination, and thus, obtains higher profits. However, in the second stage, fierce competition leads to the release of benefits, new and regular customers obtain lower prices and the platforms lose higher profits. In the long-run, discriminatory pricing is not the best option due to lower total profits. The two platforms will implement cooperative pricing or one platform becomes dominant.

Originality/value

Instead of focusing on the cross-network effects, this paper emphasizes the role of the same-side network effect on price discrimination regarding the platforms’ competition. The same-side network effects are investigated in relation to a discrimination pricing strategy and compared to a unified pricing strategy. Another innovative aspect is the study of these network effects in a dynamic setting based on a two-period competition model for two platforms.



中文翻译:

网络平台价格歧视行为及同侧网络效应研究

目的

本文的目的是研究平台之间的竞争是否可以有效,从而导致有效的分配。

设计/方法/方法

本文基于经典的线性酒店模型,使用歧视定价模型和统一定价模型两种变体,为两个竞争平台构建了一个两期竞争模型。

发现

在歧视定价模式的情况下,竞争是中等的,第一阶段两个平台平分市场,而两个平台在第二阶段倾向于为新用户提供优惠,并为老客户设定更高的价格。与统一定价模式相比,在第一阶段,平台在实施歧视时可以根据跨网络效应提供更高的价格,从而获得更高的利润。但在第二阶段,激烈的竞争导致利益的释放,新老客户获得更低的价格,平台损失更高的利润。从长远来看,由于总利润较低,歧视性定价不是最佳选择。两个平台将实行合作定价或一个平台成为主导。

原创性/价值

本文没有关注跨网络效应,而是强调同侧网络效应对平台竞争的价格歧视的作用。研究了与歧视定价策略相关的同侧网络效应,并与统一定价策略进行了比较。另一个创新方面是基于两个平台的两期竞争模型在动态环境中研究这些网络效应。

更新日期:2020-12-28
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