This article evaluates the role of executive pensions in the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. As a natural experiment, we exploit a major change to the tax-free allowances governing executive pensions. This reform affected the cost of pensions for firms whose executives had accumulated pension benefits in excess of the prescribed limit. We find a strong reaction to the reform. After 6 April 2006, many executives saw their defined benefit pension schemes replaced with risk-free cash payments. This imposition of an exogenous constraint on the contracting over CEO pay significantly decreased the relationship between executive pay and firm performance.

中文翻译：

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高管养老金和薪酬绩效关系——来自英国养老金立法变化的证据

本文评估了高管养老金在高管薪酬与企业绩效之间的关系中的作用。作为一项自然实验，我们利用了管理高管养老金的免税津贴的重大变化。对于高管积累的养老金福利超过规定限额的公司，这项改革影响了养老金成本。我们发现对改革的强烈反应。2006 年 4 月 6 日之后，许多高管看到他们的固定福利养老金计划被无风险现金支付所取代。这种对 CEO 薪酬合同的外生约束显着降低了高管薪酬与公司绩效之间的关系。