ABSTRACT

Ned Block’s overflow argument purports to establish that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural basis of access consciousness. In a recent paper, Block’s argument has been challenged by Peter Carruthers. Carruthers concedes the truth of one of the argument’s key steps, namely, that phenomenal consciousness overflows what is in working memory. At the same time, he rejects the conclusion of the argument by developing an account of this overflow that is alternative to Block’s. In this paper, I argue that Carruthers’ account does not pose a real threat to the overflow argument. The overall plausibility of Carruthers’ account rests on the empirical plausibility of a claim concerning global broadcasting which, albeit intuitively plausible in light of a lightly-sketched picture of the impact of attention upon neural matters, he offers no sufficient empirical evidence for. Drawing on some important imaging studies that reveal striking facts about neural responses to visual stimuli, I argue for two intimately related claims: first, that the intuitive plausibility of claims like Carruthers’ is not a guarantee of empirical plausibility; second, that as concers the same claims, strong empirical evidence is needed before confident judgments of empirical plausibility can reasonably be formulated.

抽象的

Ned Block的溢流论据旨在证明现象意识的神经基础独立于访问意识的神经基础。彼得·卡鲁瑟斯（Peter Carruthers）在最近的一篇论文中对布洛克的论点提出了质疑。Carruthers承认论点关键步骤之一的真实性，即现象意识超越了工作记忆中的内容。同时，他通过提出替代Block的溢出说明来拒绝论点的结论。在本文中，我认为Carruthers的说法并没有对溢出论点构成真正的威胁。Carruthers帐户的总体合理性取决于与全球广播有关的索赔的经验合理性，尽管根据注意力在神经系统问题上的略微勾画，从直观上看似合理，但他没有提供足够的经验证据。我利用一些重要的影像学研究揭示了关于视觉刺激的神经反应的惊人事实，我主张两个密切相关的主张：第一，诸如Carruthers的主张的直观合理性并不能保证经验的合理性。第二，与相同的主张一样，在可以合理地提出对经验似然性的可靠判断之前，需要有力的经验证据。像卡鲁瑟斯这样的主张的直觉上的合理性并不能保证经验上的合理性；第二，与相同的主张一样，在可以合理地提出对经验似然性的可靠判断之前，需要有力的经验证据。像卡鲁瑟斯这样的主张的直觉上的合理性并不能保证经验上的合理性；第二，与相同的主张一样，在可以合理地对经验似然性作出可靠的判断之前，需要有力的经验证据。