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Earnings management and theoretical adjustment in capital structure performance pattern: Evidence from APTA economies
Borsa Istanbul Review ( IF 4.288 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-25 , DOI: 10.1016/j.bir.2020.12.001
Adnan Shoaib 1 , Muhammad Ayub Siddiqui 1
Affiliation  

This study examines the role of earnings management in the relationship between firm performance and capital structure, dividing earnings management into discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals to test established theories on the capital structure. Using data on 802 companies in the member countries of the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), our findings reveal that, in the absence of earnings management, the relationship between the capital structure and firm performance follows the trade-off theory or the pecking-order theory. Our results are consistent with agency theory only through managers’ intervention via earnings management. In India, substantial opportunistic behavior in discretionary accruals is observed, and management seems to focus on manipulating capital structure performance in opportunistic ways. Furthermore, discretionary earnings are focused more on hiding asset inefficiency that arises from forced increases in firm size, reducing earnings risk. These practices reduce the impact of the capital structure on firm performance. This study has vital implications for debt managers and performance analysts in APTA member countries. Rather than testing the applicability in a traditional way, this study recommends dividing earnings management into discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals to test capital structure theories. Because nondiscretionary accruals play a dominant role in earnings management, firm behavior is consistent with trade-off or pecking-order theory, as seen in patterns in the relationship between the capital structure and firm performance, whereas agency theory holds only after external intervention by managers in terms of earnings management.



中文翻译:

资本结构绩效模式的盈余管理与理论调整:来自APTA经济体的证据

本研究考察了盈余管理在公司业绩和资本结构之间的关系中的作用,将盈余管理分为可自由支配和非可自由支配的应计项目,以检验关于资本结构的既定理论。利用亚太贸易协定(APTA)成员国802家公司的数据,我们的研究结果表明,在没有盈余管理的情况下,资本结构与企业绩效之间的关系遵循权衡理论或啄食理论。序理论。我们的结果与代理理论一致,仅通过经理通过盈余管理进行干预。在印度,观察到可自由支配应计项目的大量机会主义行为,管理层似乎专注于以机会主义方式操纵资本结构绩效。此外,可自由支配的收益更侧重于隐藏因公司规模被迫增加而导致的资产效率低下,从而降低收益风险。这些做法减少了资本结构对公司业绩的影响。这项研究对 APTA 成员国的债务经理和绩效分析师具有重要意义。本研究建议将盈余管理分为可自由支配和非可自由支配的应计项目来检验资本结构理论,而不是以传统方式测试其适用性。由于非全权应计在盈余管理中起主导作用,公司行为与权衡或啄序理论一致,如资本结构和公司业绩之间的关系模式所示,

更新日期:2020-12-25
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