This paper studies the interplay between central and local governments in defining the optimal degree of decentralization in terms of public goods supply. The choice between full centralization and asymmetric decentralization implies a trade-off between the possibility to provide public goods at a lower cost, wherever this is possible by decentralizing, and the possibility to fully internalize spillovers by full centralization. We find that asymmetric decentralization introduces distortions into the public decision-making process. We also demonstrate that the power to interfere in the central government’s ruling mechanisms should be reduced for the jurisdictions that have decentralized, in order to make their decentralization choice convenient even for the citizens in the less efficient jurisdictions. Finally, we find the conditions under which asymmetric decentralization can be simultaneously advantageous for both rich and poor regions through the design of appropriate equalization transfers.

本文研究了中央政府和地方政府在确定公共产品供给的最佳分权程度方面的相互作用。在完全集中化与不对称分散化之间进行选择意味着在以较低成本提供公共产品的可能性（通过分散化有可能）与通过完全集中化将溢出完全内部化的可能性之间进行权衡。我们发现，不对称的权力下放在公共决策过程中引入了扭曲。我们还表明，对于权力下放的司法管辖区，应该减少干涉中央政府的统治机制的权力，以使权力下放的选择更为方便，即使对于效率较低的司法管辖区的公民也是如此。最后，