We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer's potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap. Our analysis has implications for applications as diverse as the design of worker compensation, the awarding of research grants, and the allocation of foreign aid.

中文翻译：

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委派绩效评估

当绩效评估委托给审查者时，我们研究了与多个代理的最佳激励合同。审稿人可能偏向于代理人，但委托人不知道偏向的程度。我们证明了一个竞赛，即委托人确定要分配给代理的一组奖品的合同，是最佳的。通过使用竞赛，校长可以承诺维持激励措施，尽管审阅者可能有宽大处理的偏见。最佳努力配置文件可以通过具有上限的全付费拍卖来唯一地实现。我们的分析对诸如工人薪酬设计、研究资助的授予和外援分配等多种应用具有影响。