Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple legislative veto players and show that inefficient policy instruments are politically easier than efficient instruments to repeal. Anticipating this, heterogeneous legislators agree more readily on an inefficient policy instrument. We describe when inefficient instruments are likely to be chosen, and predict that they are used more frequently in (moderately) polarized political environments and in volatile economic environments. We show conditions under which players strictly benefit from the availability of the inefficient instrument.

中文翻译：

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僵局和低效的政策工具

为什么理性的政治家会选择低效的政策工具？例如，即使在提供具有成本效益的庇古税的情况下，环境监管也经常采用技术标准和配额的形式。为了阐明这个难题，我们提出了一个具有多个立法否决权的随机博弈，并表明低效的政策工具在政治上比有效的工具更容易废除。预料到这一点，不同类型的立法者更容易就效率低下的政策工具达成一致。我们描述了何时可能选择低效工具，并预测它们在（适度）两极分化的政治环境和动荡的经济环境中会更频繁地使用。我们展示了玩家从低效工具的可用性中严格受益的条件。