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Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
Theoretical Economics ( IF 1.671 ) Pub Date : 2019-01-01 , DOI: 10.3982/te3565
William H. Sandholm 1 , Segismundo S. Izquierdo 2 , Luis R. Izquierdo 3
Affiliation  

We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the Centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game. Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play.

中文翻译:

蜈蚣游戏中最有经验的回报动态和合作

我们研究了人口博弈动态,在这种情况下,每个修改代理对他的每个策略进行固定次数的测试,每个策略的每次游戏都针对一个新抽取的对手,并选择总收益最高的策略。在蜈蚣游戏中,这些最有经验的回报动态导致合作游戏。当策略被测试一次时,在几乎全局稳定状态下的游戏集中在游戏的最后几个节点上,每个策略的代理比例在很大程度上与游戏的长度无关。多次测试策略会导致循环播放。
更新日期:2019-01-01
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