We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information; the principal cannot use monetary transfers to elicit this information, but can verify an agent's claim at a cost. We characterize the mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the principal. This mechanism can be implemented as a cardinal voting rule, in which agents can either cast a baseline vote, indicating only whether they are in favor of the new policy, or they make specific claims about their type. The principal gives more weight to specific claims and verifies a claim whenever it is decisive.

中文翻译：

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集体决策中成本高昂的验证

我们研究了当与决策相关的信息由代理人私人持有时，委托人应如何在实施新政策和维持现状之间做出最佳选择。代理人在透露他们的信息方面具有战略意义；委托人不能使用货币转移来获取此信息，但可以付费验证代理人的索赔。我们描述了最大化委托人预期效用的机制。这种机制可以作为基本投票规则来实现，其中代理可以进行基线投票，仅表明他们是否支持新政策，或者他们对自己的类型做出具体声明。委托人更重视具体的主张，并在决定性主张时予以核实。