In this Article, we ask whether some liberal justices have followed a strategy of judicial appeasement in recent cases involving religious freedom, especially under the Establishment Clause. We begin by specifying a conception of appeasement, which we define as a sustained strategy of offering asymmetric concessions for the purpose of avoiding further conflict, but with the self-defeating effect of emboldening an adversary to take more assertive actions. This conception is a general one, and to avoid confusion, we disclaim moral comparisons to historic instances. We then apply this conception to leading cases in three areas of doctrine: government religious speech (with special attention to the Bladensburg Cross case), state funding of religion, and religious exemptions. Across these cases, a pattern of decision-making has emerged that provides evidence of judicial appeasement by some liberal justices. We then argue that appeasement carries risks for worsening legal outcomes, legitimating bad decisions, and shifting the set of feasible constitutional options. In response, it might be objected that liberal justices are not engaging in appeasement but rather in strategies of compromise or cooptation. Although these alternatives have some plausibility, we argue that the pattern of decision-making in recent religious freedom cases should raise concerns about appeasement and the risks associated with it.

中文翻译：

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设立条款绥靖

在本文中，我们询问一些自由派法官是否在最近涉及宗教自由的案件中采取了司法绥靖的策略，尤其是在建制条款下。我们首先明确了绥靖的概念，我们将其定义为为避免进一步冲突而提供不对称让步的持续战略，但具有鼓励对手采取更果断行动的自我挫败效果。这个概念是一个普遍的概念，为避免混淆，我们拒绝与历史实例进行道德比较。然后，我们将这一概念应用于三个教义领域的主要案例：政府宗教言论（特别关注布拉登斯堡十字架案）、国家对宗教的资助和宗教豁免。在这些案例中，已经出现了一种决策模式，为一些自由派法官的司法绥靖提供了证据。然后，我们认为绥靖会带来恶化法律结果、使错误决定合法化以及改变可行的宪法选择集的风险。作为回应，可能会反对自由主义法官不是在从事绥靖，而是在妥协或合作的战略。尽管这些替代方案具有一定的合理性，但我们认为，最近宗教自由案件中的决策模式应该引起人们对绥靖政策及其相关风险的担忧。可能有人会反对自由派法官不是在从事绥靖政策，而是采取妥协或合作的战略。尽管这些替代方案具有一定的合理性，但我们认为，最近宗教自由案件中的决策模式应该引起人们对绥靖政策及其相关风险的担忧。可能有人会反对自由派法官不是在从事绥靖政策，而是采取妥协或合作的战略。尽管这些替代方案具有一定的合理性，但我们认为，最近宗教自由案件中的决策模式应该引起人们对绥靖政策及其相关风险的担忧。