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The Structural Function of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice
The Supreme Court Review ( IF 1.333 ) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 , DOI: 10.1086/691355 John Rappaport
The Supreme Court Review ( IF 1.333 ) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 , DOI: 10.1086/691355 John Rappaport
The “root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment’s Counsel Clause is the right to retain counsel of one’s choice. Yet until just last Term, no criminal defendant had ever persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse a conviction on counsel-of-choice grounds; many had tried in vain. I consider in this paper whether there is any satisfying, functional account that can explain the disjuncture between what the Court says about the right and what it does when presented with an asserted violation of that right. The leading theories justify the right to counsel of choice either as securing the effective assistance of counsel, and thus a fair trial, or as a facet of the defendant’s prerogative to control his own defense. These theories, however — grounded in majestic-sounding notions of fairness and autonomy, respectively — struggle to explain counsel-of-choice doctrine. For one thing, indigent defendants simply have no right to choose their counsel at all. And while criminal procedure rights are seldom absolute, balancing the defendant’s fairness and autonomy interests against the government’s countervailing needs cannot explain the pattern of Court decisions in anything but the most ad hoc manner. My claim is that something very different explains the Court’s counsel-of-choice decisions. The right to counsel of choice functions not as a powerful individual entitlement, but rather as a weak, system-level safeguard against socialization of the criminal defense bar. I use “socialization” here in the political and not the social psychological sense, to refer to “the action or process of bringing” an institution “under state ownership or public control.” Only when the government advances a theory for restraining defendant choice that, if accepted, would allow it to strangle the private defense bar and socialize criminal defense does this anti-socialization principle require that the right to counsel of choice prevail. This means that even a weak government interest — like a judge’s desire to push a case to trial quickly — can overcome the right as long as that interest is meaningfully bounded in its reach across the criminal docket.
中文翻译:
第六修正案选择律师权的结构功能
第六修正案的律师条款的“根本含义”是保留自己选择的律师的权利。然而,直到上个学期,还没有刑事被告人说服美国最高法院以选择的律师为由撤销定罪;许多人都徒劳无功。我在本文中考虑是否有任何令人满意的、功能性的说明可以解释法院关于该权利的说法与它在声称侵犯该权利时所做的事情之间的脱节。主要理论证明选择律师的权利是正当的,要么是确保律师的有效协助,从而是公平审判,要么是被告控制自己辩护的特权的一个方面。然而,这些理论——以听起来雄伟的公平和自治概念为基础,分别——努力解释选择律师的教义。一方面,贫困的被告根本没有权利选择他们的律师。虽然刑事诉讼权很少是绝对的,但平衡被告的公平和自主利益与政府的反补贴需求不能以最临时的方式解释法院判决的模式。我的主张是,有一些非常不同的东西可以解释法院的选择律师的决定。选择律师的权利并不是一种强大的个人权利,而是一种针对刑事辩护律师社会化的薄弱的系统级保障。我在这里使用政治而非社会心理意义上的“社会化”来指代“将”一个机构“置于国家所有或公共控制之下的行为或过程”。” 只有当政府提出一种限制被告选择的理论,如果被接受,将允许其扼杀私人辩护律师并将刑事辩护社会化,这种反社会化原则才要求选择律师的权利占上风。这意味着,即使是微弱的政府利益——比如法官希望迅速将案件推向审判的愿望——也可以克服这一权利,只要该利益在其在刑事案件中的影响范围内有意义地受到限制。
更新日期:2017-01-01
中文翻译:
第六修正案选择律师权的结构功能
第六修正案的律师条款的“根本含义”是保留自己选择的律师的权利。然而,直到上个学期,还没有刑事被告人说服美国最高法院以选择的律师为由撤销定罪;许多人都徒劳无功。我在本文中考虑是否有任何令人满意的、功能性的说明可以解释法院关于该权利的说法与它在声称侵犯该权利时所做的事情之间的脱节。主要理论证明选择律师的权利是正当的,要么是确保律师的有效协助,从而是公平审判,要么是被告控制自己辩护的特权的一个方面。然而,这些理论——以听起来雄伟的公平和自治概念为基础,分别——努力解释选择律师的教义。一方面,贫困的被告根本没有权利选择他们的律师。虽然刑事诉讼权很少是绝对的,但平衡被告的公平和自主利益与政府的反补贴需求不能以最临时的方式解释法院判决的模式。我的主张是,有一些非常不同的东西可以解释法院的选择律师的决定。选择律师的权利并不是一种强大的个人权利,而是一种针对刑事辩护律师社会化的薄弱的系统级保障。我在这里使用政治而非社会心理意义上的“社会化”来指代“将”一个机构“置于国家所有或公共控制之下的行为或过程”。” 只有当政府提出一种限制被告选择的理论,如果被接受,将允许其扼杀私人辩护律师并将刑事辩护社会化,这种反社会化原则才要求选择律师的权利占上风。这意味着,即使是微弱的政府利益——比如法官希望迅速将案件推向审判的愿望——也可以克服这一权利,只要该利益在其在刑事案件中的影响范围内有意义地受到限制。