Recent technological innovations allow insurance providers to closely monitor and collect detailed data on their customers’ behaviors. Such innovations offer potential benefits by mitigating moral-hazard problems but may provide the incumbent with a lasting first-mover advantage, which may harm consumers. We investigate these outcomes in the context of pay-how-you-drive (PHYD) auto insurance, which offers tailored discounts to drivers monitored by telematics devices. We exploit the staggered entry of PHYD insurance across states and insurers in a difference-in-differences framework. While innovating firms experience initial profit increases, the profits are eroded by entry, which suggests that this innovation does not raise novel antitrust concerns. Furthermore, we find a meaningful impact of PHYD programs on fatal car accidents. Our findings are consistent with impacts implied by canonical theoretical models.

中文翻译：

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远程信息处理对保险业竞争和消费者行为的影响

最新的技术创新使保险提供商可以密切监视和收集有关其客户行为的详细数据。这样的创新通过减轻道德风险问题提供了潜在的好处，但可能为在位者提供持久的先发优势，这可能会损害消费者。我们在按车付款方式（PHYD）汽车保险的背景下调查这些结果，该保险为远程信息处理设备监控的驾驶员提供量身定制的折扣。我们利用差异中的差异框架，跨州和保险公司错开PHYD保险。尽管创新公司经历了最初的利润增长，但利润却因进入市场而受到侵蚀，这表明这种创新不会引起新的反托拉斯问题。此外，我们发现PHYD计划对致命的交通事故具有有意义的影响。