当前位置: X-MOL 学术The Journal of Law and Economics › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
The Role of Ideology in Judicial Evaluations of Experts
The Journal of Law and Economics ( IF 1.840 ) Pub Date : 2019-11-01 , DOI: 10.1086/705838
Eric Helland

I provide a test of the legal realist theory of judicial behavior, which posits that judges’ ideology impacts their legal decisions but that the law constrains the judges’ ability to exercise those preferences. Two competing theories, legal skepticism and formalism, posit that the law either provides a minimal constraint on judges’ preferences or allows only minimal discretion by judges. The difficulty in testing these theories is a lack of data on the legal constraints judges face. I examine Daubert/Rule 702 rulings to exclude scientific testimony by plaintiffs’ experts in a series of lawsuits. Because I have multiple observations across experts, I can give each expert a fixed effect, which removes any constant features of the expert’s testimony. Even after controlling for law, I find robust evidence that ideology plays an important role in the decision to grant a motion to exclude a witness.

中文翻译:

意识形态在专家司法评价中的作用

我对司法行为的法律现实主义理论进行了检验,该理论认为法官的意识形态会影响他们的法律决定,但法律会限制法官行使这些偏好的能力。法律怀疑论和形式主义这两种相互对立的理论认为,法律要么对法官的偏好提供了最小限度的约束,要么仅对法官提供了最小的酌处权。检验这些理论的困难在于缺乏法官所面临的法律约束方面的数据。我审查了Daubert / Rule 702的裁决,以排除原告专家在一系列诉讼中的科学证词。因为我对专家有多种观察,所以我可以给每位专家一个固定的效果,从而消除了专家证言的任何恒定特征。即使在控制法律之后
更新日期:2019-11-01
down
wechat
bug