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Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency
The Journal of Law and Economics ( IF 1.840 ) Pub Date : 2020-02-01 , DOI: 10.1086/705829
Claudia M. Landeo , Kathryn E. Spier

This paper studies the design of optimal enforcement policies with ordered leniency to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With ordered leniency, the degree of leniency granted to an injurer who self-reports depends on his or her position in the self-reporting queue. We show that the ordered-leniency policy that induces maximal deterrence gives successively larger discounts to injurers who secure higher positions in the reporting queue. This creates a so-called race to the courthouse in which all injurers self-report promptly and, as a result, social harm is reduced. We show that the expected fine increases with the size of the group, which thus discourages the formation of large illegal enterprises. The first-best outcome is obtained with ordered leniency when the externalities associated with the harmful activities are not too great. Our findings complement Kaplow and Shavell’s results for single-injurer environments.

中文翻译:

有序宽容的最佳执法

本文研究了有序宽大处理的最佳执行策略的设计,以发现并阻止伤害者群体实施的有害短期活动。在有序宽大处理的情况下,授予自我报告的伤害者的宽大处理程度取决于其在自我报告队列中的位置。我们表明,引起最大威慑的有序宽大政策会给在报告队列中占据较高位置的伤害者带来更大的折扣。这就造成了所谓的向法院的竞赛,所有伤害者都应在该竞赛中迅速自我报告,从而减少了社会伤害。我们表明,预期罚款随着集团规模的增加而增加,从而阻碍了大型非法企业的形成。当与有害活动相关的外部性不太大时,可以有条理地宽大处理,获得最好的结果。我们的发现补充了Kaplow和Shavell在单注射器环境中的结果。
更新日期:2020-02-01
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