Is privatization in a country related to the stringency of its employment protection laws (EPLs)—and, if so, how? We address these questions using privatization deals in 14 European countries over 3 decades and the changes in EPLs in a country. Using traditional difference-in-differences tests exploiting major changes and generalized difference-in-differences tests for the full sample, we find that stringent EPLs discourage privatization. For identification, we use two sets of triple-difference tests that control for country-level omitted variables using fixed effects for each country-year pair. First, using cross-sectional differences across industries in a country, we find that the effect of EPLs on privatization is disproportionately greater in industries in which separation rates and relocation rates are higher. Second, using productivity measures for US industries as an instrument, we find that the effect of EPLs on privatization is disproportionately greater in less productive industries.

中文翻译：

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就业保护法与私有化

一个国家的私有化是否与其就业保护法（EPL）的严格性有关？如果是，那么如何？我们使用过去3年中在14个欧洲国家的私有化交易以及一个国家的EPL的变化来解决这些问题。使用利用主要变化的传统差异测试和整个样本的通用差异测试，我们发现严格的EPL不利于私有化。为了进行识别，我们使用了两组三差检验，以每个国家-年份对的固定效应控制国家/地区遗漏变量。首先，利用一个国家不同行业的横截面差异，我们发现，在分离率和搬迁率较高的行业中，EPL对私有化的影响不成比例。第二，