We study the effects of legal protection on the likelihood of efficient trade. Fairness norms that affect the parties’ willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) may depend on how strongly the entitlement is protected. We show that our participants can be divided into three groups corresponding to three fairness norms: negative types, whose WTP and WTA are decreasing in the strength of the legal remedy; positive types, whose WTP and WTA are increasing in the strength of the legal remedy; and flat types, whose WTP and WTA do not depend on the strength of the legal remedy. We find that type is role dependent such that a higher WTP and a lower WTA—the combination most conducive to efficient trade—is obtained with a weaker legal remedy.

中文翻译：

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如何保护权利：实验

我们研究了法律保护对有效贸易可能性的影响。影响当事方的支付意愿（WTP）和接受意愿（WTA）的公平规范可能取决于对权利的保护程度。我们证明，我们的参与者可以分为三类，分别对应于三个公平规范：消极类型，其WTP和WTA的法律救济强度在下降；积极类型，其WTP和WTA的法律补救力度正在增加；以及WTP和WTA的单位类型不取决于法律救济的力度。我们发现，类型取决于角色，因此使用较弱的法律补救措施可以获得较高的WTP和较低的WTA（最有助于有效贸易的组合）。