We consider vertical contracts in which the retail market may involve search frictions. Minimum-advertised-price (MAP) restrictions act as a restraint on customers’ information and can therefore increase search frictions in the retail sector. Such restraints thereby soften retail competition—an impact also generated by resale price maintenance (RPM). However, by accommodating (consumer or retailer) heterogeneity, MAP restrictions can allow for higher manufacturer profits than RPM. We show that these restrictions can do so through facilitating price discrimination among consumers, encouraging service provision, and facilitating manufacturer collusion. Thus, welfare effects may be positive or negative compared with RPM or with the absence of such restrictions.

中文翻译：

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垂直信息约束：最低广告价格限制的正面和反竞争影响

我们考虑零售市场可能涉及搜索摩擦的垂直合同。最低广告价格（MAP）限制是对客户信息的限制，因此可能会增加零售部门的搜索摩擦。这样的限制从而软化了零售竞争-转售价格维持（RPM）也产生了影响。但是，通过适应（消费者或零售商）异质性，MAP限制可以允许制造商获得比RPM更高的利润。我们表明，这些限制可以通过促进消费者之间的价格歧视，鼓励提供服务以及促进制造商串通来实现。因此，与RPM相比或没有这种限制的情况下，福利影响可能是正面的，也可能是负面的。