Abstract We examine that the bilateral supplier affects the incentive contracts that owners of retailers offer their managers, assuming that the manufacturer sets the input price after observing the terms of the incentive contracts offered to management in the downstream market. Thus, we compare the two models: (1) decentralized bargaining between manufacturers and retailers including two-part tariff contract (2) linear input pricing without bargaining. Contrast to previous studies, we find that in equilibrium, the owners of retailers offer delegation contracts to managers for output restriction regardless of competition modes when offering linear input pricing, which implies that owners do not face a prisoners’ dilemma situation and Pareto superior profit is obtained for retailer. Thus, managerial delegation of retailer is not socially desirable due to the output restriction. Furthermore, decentralized bargaining allows to equalize all the equilibrium outcomes in the different delegation structure under both Bertrand and Cournot competition and leads no delegation for the endogenous delegation problem.

中文翻译：

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具有垂直外部性的垂直竞争链的管理委托

摘要我们假设双边制造商在遵守下游市场提供给管理者的激励合同条款后设定了输入价格，从而检验了双边供应商是否会影响零售商所有者向经理提供的激励合同。因此，我们比较了两种模型：（1）制造商和零售商之间的分散式讨价还价，包括两部分关税合同；（2）线性投入定价而没有讨价还价。与先前的研究相比，我们发现在均衡状态下，零售商的所有者在提供线性投入物定价时，无论竞争模式如何，都会向管理者提供委托合同，以限制产量，这意味着所有者不会面临囚徒的困境，帕累托的超额利润是为零售商获得。从而，由于产量限制，零售商的管理委派在社会上是不可取的。此外，分散式讨价还价可以使在Bertrand和Cournot竞争下，不同委派结构中的所有均衡结果均等，并且不会导致内生委派问题的委派。