Abstract We investigate firms’ behavior in demand-enhancing product R&D. We consider and compare a cooperative and non-cooperative R&D investment setting by firms. In a non-cooperative scenario (R&D competition), firms decide on their R&D investments and outputs unilaterally. In a cooperative scenario (R&D coopetition), firms engage in a bargaining process to reach a binding R&D agreement. Firms through bargaining can reach an R&D agreement which specifies their R&D investment levels. The investment levels under R&D coopetition are higher compared with the investment levels under R&D competition. Firms’ profits are also higher under R&D coopetition compared with R&D competition. We conclude that R&D coopetition can alleviate the individual R&D investment disincentive and work as a strategic instrument that enhances product innovation and firms’ profits.

中文翻译：

---

产品研发竞争与企业绩效

摘要我们研究了企业在需求增强型产品研发中的行为。我们考虑并比较了公司的合作和非合作研发投资设置。在非合作情况下（R＆D竞争），公司会单方面决定其R＆D投资和产出。在合作场景（R＆D合作）中，企业参与讨价还价过程以达成具有约束力的R＆D协议。通过讨价还价的公司可以达成一项研发协议，其中规定了其研发投资水平。研发竞合下的投资水平高于研发竞争下的投资水平。与R＆D竞争相比，在R＆D合作中公司的利润也更高。我们得出结论，R＆D合作可以减轻个人R＆D