Abstract In an environment in which a buyer and a seller make ex-ante investments, competition among sellers can solve the hold-up problem without the design of ex-ante contracts but, in the case of low levels of competition, this may lead to inefficient investments. This paper shows that a seller invests efficiently when each seller offers latent contracts designed to exclude any other seller from trade (i. e. most intense competition). Because competition among sellers allows the buyer to appropriate part of the gains from his investment, the hold-up problem vanishes for most of the buyer’s investment costs. However, the seller appropriates more than his marginal contribution to the gains from trade, and over-invests, when a group of sellers does not offer latent contracts (under less intense competition). Therefore, efficient investments can only be implemented when competition is at its most intense.

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与非排他性合同的竞争：解决搁置问题

摘要在买卖双方进行事前投资的环境中，买卖双方之间的竞争可以解决持有问题，而无需设计事前合同，但是在竞争水平较低的情况下，这可能导致低效的投资。本文表明，当每个卖方提供旨在将其他任何卖方排除在贸易之外的潜在合同（即最激烈的竞争）时，卖方就可以有效地进行投资。由于卖方之间的竞争使买方可以从其投资中获得部分收益，因此大部分买方的投资成本中的滞留问题消失了。但是，当一组卖方不提供潜在合同时（在竞争不那么激烈的情况下），卖方将超出其边际贡献的部分用于贸易和过度投资。因此，