Abstract This paper studies optimal incentives in the presence of an agent’s preference for generosity, where the principal optimally chooses the level of generosity (rent) as well as the performance-based pay. We show that some minimum level of reciprocity is required for generous contracts to become attractive. More reciprocal agents exert greater effort, but they may not necessarily receive more generous offers, as our model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between generosity and the reciprocity parameter. This means that moderately reciprocal agents tend to receive a premium relative to weakly or strongly reciprocal agents. Generosity and performance-based pay are likely to behave as complements when risk-sharing motives (determined by noise in the environment and the agent’s degree of risk-aversion) are strong, and they are likely to behave as substitutes when risk-sharing motives are relatively moderate. Moreover, base-wage gifts are always optimal, whereas piece-rate or composite gifts are only optimal in a low-noise environment.

中文翻译：

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礼物交换下的最佳激励

摘要本文研究了在代理人偏爱慷慨的情况下的最优激励机制，其中委托人最优地选择慷慨的水平（租金）以及基于绩效的薪酬。我们表明，慷慨的合同变得有吸引力需要最低限度的互惠水平。更多的互惠代理商会付出更大的努力，但由于我们的模型预测了慷慨与互惠参数之间的驼峰状关系，因此他们不一定会获得更多的慷慨要约。这意味着相对于弱互惠代理或中等互惠代理，中等互惠代理倾向于收取溢价。当风险分担动机（由环境中的噪声和代理商的风险规避程度决定）很强时，慷慨和基于绩效的薪酬可能会起到补充作用，当风险分担动机相对温和时，他们很可能会充当替代者。此外，基本工资礼物始终是最佳选择，而计件或复合礼物仅在低噪声环境中才是最佳选择。