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Fiat Money as a Public Signal, Medium of Exchange, and Punishment
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics ( IF 0.288 ) Pub Date : 2020-02-26 , DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2019-0098
Pedro Gomis-Porqueras 1 , Ching-Jen Sun 1
Affiliation  

Abstract This paper studies different welfare-enhancing roles that fiat money can have. To do so, we consider an indivisible monetary framework where agents are randomly and bilaterally matched, while the government has weak enforcement powers. Within this environment, we analyze state contingent monetary policies and characterize the resulting equilibria under different government record-keeping technologies. We show that a threat of injecting fiat money, conditional on private actions, can improve allocations and achieve efficiency. This type of state contingent policy is effective even when the government cannot observe any private trades and agents can only communicate with the government through cheap talk. In all these equilibria fiat money and self-enforcing credit are complements in the off equilibrium. Finally, this type of equilibria can also emerge even when the injection of fiat money is not a public signal.

中文翻译:

法定货币作为公共信号,交换媒介和惩罚

摘要本文研究了法定货币可能具有的不同的福利提升作用。为此,我们考虑了一个不可分割的货币框架,在该框架中,代理商是随机和双边匹配的,而政府的执法权却很弱。在这种环境下,我们分析国家或有货币政策,并根据不同的政府记录保持技术来描述由此产生的均衡。我们表明,以私人行动为条件注入法定货币的威胁可以改善分配并实现效率。即使政府无法观察到任何私人交易,而代理商只能通过廉价谈话与政府进行沟通,这种国家应急政策仍然有效。在所有这些均衡中,法定货币和自我执行的信贷是非均衡中的补充。最后,
更新日期:2020-02-26
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