Abstract Two well-known mechanisms for enhancing managers’ accountability are yardstick competition and internal monitoring. Yardstick competition puts managers in direct competition when firms make decisions for re-appointment. Monitoring is used by firms to detect managers’ rent-seeking activities. While common wisdom suggests that the joint use of the two means would reinforce each other in promoting managers good practices, we find that their interplay distorts managers’ behavior who may end up acting in a less accountable way. Furthermore, differences in monitoring across firms bias that distortion, yielding even more counterintuitive results.

中文翻译：

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标尺竞争下的管理责任制

摘要提高管理者责任感的两种众所周知的机制是标准竞争和内部监控。当公司做出重新任命的决定时，码尺竞争会使经理进入直接竞争。公司使用监视来检测经理的寻租活动。虽然常识表明，这两种手段的共同使用将在促进管理者的良好做法上相互加强，但我们发现，两者的相互作用会扭曲管理者的行为，使他们的行为最终以一种不太负责任的方式行事。此外，跨公司监控的差异会导致这种失真，从而产生更加违反直觉的结果。