Abstract Workers, firms and policymakers often face a trade-off between shorter unemployment spells on the one hand, and better quality matches on the other. During recessions this manifests itself through job competition, where high skilled workers misallocate their labor to positions for which they are over-qualified in order get back to work faster. In the presence of job-specific human capital, as high skilled workers gain experience in this low skilled sector they may find themselves “locked in” to these jobs. This is because workers will not want to lose their seniority by searching for a job that better utilizes their general human capital. As a result, this misallocation can persist even in economic recoveries leading to inefficient outcomes. This paper explores such an economy and finds that a UI system that becomes more generous during a recession increases welfare and better allocates human capital over the business cycle.

中文翻译：

---

就业竞争，人力资本和锁定效应：失业保险能否有效分配人力资本

摘要工人，企业和政策制定者经常面临一方面较短的失业期与较高质量的匹配度之间的权衡。在经济衰退期间，这通过工作竞争得以体现，在此竞争中，高技能工人将他们的劳动力分配到了他们过分合格的职位上，以便更快地恢复工作。在存在特定工作的人力资本的情况下，随着高技能工人在这一低技能行业中获得经验，他们可能会发现自己“被锁定”在这些工作中。这是因为工人不会希望通过寻找能够更好地利用其一般人力资本的工作而失去资历。结果，即使在经济复苏中，这种分配错误也可能持续存在，从而导致无效的结果。