Abstract Much has been written on how an active central bank produces inflation outcomes above and beyond what commitment policy would produce. This paper contributes to this body of literature by simulating from the state estimates of both commitment and discretionary policy equilibria in a familiar dynamic New–Keynesian framework. Optimal interest rate and inflation rate policies are derived under the two regimes for six developed economies. The model is estimated using Bayesian methods employing a random-walk Metropolis–Hastings algorithm. Optimal inflation and interest rate policies for each of the economies are simulated. Results suggest that the simulated inflation induced by discretionary policy is not significantly different from commitment policy after 2000 for five of the six countries (including the U.S). Simulated commitment interest rate policy is on average 1.9% higher at the center of the distribution, suggesting that discretionary interest rate policy is on average more often loose compared to commitment interest rate policy. Simulations of the average inflation deviation and welfare loss of discretion policy indicate are greatest when the central bank exhibits low preference for inflation targeting and high preference for output stability.

中文翻译：

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承诺政策比裁量政策好多少？来自六个发达经济体的证据

摘要关于活跃的央行如何产生超出承诺政策产生的通胀结果的文章很多。本文通过在一个熟悉的动态新凯恩斯主义框架下从国家对承诺和自由裁量政策均衡的估计中模拟，为这一文献做出了贡献。最优利率和通货膨胀率政策是根据两个制度为六个发达经济体制定的。该模型是使用贝叶斯方法估计的，该方法采用了随机行走的Metropolis-Hastings算法。模拟了每个经济体的最优通货膨胀和利率政策。结果表明，在六个国家（包括美国）中，有五个国家（包括美国）在2000年之后通过全权委托政策诱发的模拟通货膨胀与承诺政策没有显着差异。模拟的承诺利率政策在分布中心平均高出1.9％，这表明与承诺利率政策相比，全权委托利率政策通常更为宽松。当中央银行对通货膨胀目标的偏低偏好和对产出稳定性的偏爱较高时，对平均通货膨胀偏差和自由裁量权福利损失的模拟表明，这是最大的。