The credit crisis of 2008 triggered global financial distress – particularly in banks. As a direct result, regulators were mobilised to alter banks’ capital structure so that losses and bankruptcy costs could be shouldered by the banks’ creditors rather than by taxpayers as was the case in most developed markets for the 2008 crisis (Sundaresan 2013). One of the many suggestions put forward by global regulatory authorities was the proposal that banks should implement and install contingent convertible debt (CoCos), which automatically convert into equity when prespecified trigger levels are breached. These triggers could be accounting information based, market price based, or wholly decided by bank supervisors. Whatever the initiating event, the aim is to ensure the automatic recapitalisation of the bank when crises occur to liberate them from the ensuing debt service (and default) payments (Albul, Jaffee & Tchistyi 2010).

中文翻译：

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探索非洲银行的或有可转换债券替代方案

2008年的信贷危机引发了全球金融危机，尤其是在银行。直接的结果是，调动了监管机构来改变银行的资本结构，使损失和破产成本可以由银行的债权人承担，而不是由纳税人承担，这与大多数发达市场在2008年危机中的情况一样（Sundaresan，2013年）。全球监管机构提出的许多建议之一是，银行应实施和安装或有可转换债务（CoCos）的建议，当超出预定触发水平时，该债务将自动转换为权益。这些触发因素可以是基于会计信息，基于市场价格，或完全由银行主管决定。不管发生什么事