Abstract This paper considers the organization of a single (domestic) payment system. When card issuers that are members of a payment system set their fees individually, this gives rise to a free-riding problem, as in providing access to different customers, card issuers are complements from the perspective of each merchant. When payment systems can threaten to exclude, in particular, card issuers with a smaller customer base that do not adhere to a common cap on fees, this allows to restore the full internalization outcome, leading to lower fees but higher profits and higher welfare. When payment systems cannot threaten to exclude card issuers, the full internalization outcome arises only when card issuers are sufficiently symmetric.

中文翻译：

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通过费用上限对支付系统进行自我监管

摘要本文考虑了单一（国内）支付系统的组织。当作为支付系统成员的发卡机构分别设置其费用时，这就产生了搭便车的问题，就像在提供对不同客户的访问权限方面，从每个商人的角度看，发卡机构都是补充。当支付系统可能会威胁要排除特别是客户群较小，不遵循共同费用上限的发卡机构时，这可以恢复完整的内部化结果，从而导致费用降低，但利润更高，福利更高。当支付系统不能威胁排除发卡行时，只有在发卡行充分对称的情况下才会产生完全的内部化结果。