当前位置:
X-MOL 学术
›
Review of Central and East European Law
›
论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
The Impact of Contingency Fees on Collective Antitrust Actions: Experiments from Lithuania and Poland
Review of Central and East European Law ( IF 0.103 ) Pub Date : 2016-11-11 , DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04103005 Žygimantas Juška 1
Review of Central and East European Law ( IF 0.103 ) Pub Date : 2016-11-11 , DOI: 10.1163/15730352-04103005 Žygimantas Juška 1
Affiliation
Contingency-fee agreements are one—if not the only—tool that can be used to ensure that small-stakes collective antitrust actions are heard, yet they are subject to strong resistance from the European Union. There is a concern that contingency fees could lead to abuses of the system or conflicts of interest, as has been seen in the United States. Contrary to EU policy, two proactive member states—Lithuania and Poland—have introduced the possibility of using contingency fees in group litigation in order to facilitate group actions. Despite having a lot of potential, this paper will demonstrate that the introduction alone of contingency fees will not facilitate the compensation objective that is embedded in the Directive on damages actions. In addition, it will show that the safeguard policy against frivolous litigation is sufficient to limit the possibilities for litigation abuses, but it is ineffective for monitoring the individual behavior of group representatives.
中文翻译:
应急费用对集体反垄断行动的影响:立陶宛和波兰的实验
应急费用协议是一种(如果不是唯一的)工具,可用于确保听取小额集体反垄断诉讼的意见,但它们受到欧盟的强烈抵制。正如在美国所看到的那样,有人担心应急费用可能会导致系统滥用或利益冲突。与欧盟政策相反,两个积极进取的成员国——立陶宛和波兰——引入了在集体诉讼中使用应急费用的可能性,以促进集体诉讼。尽管有很大的潜力,但本文将证明,仅引入应急费用不会促进包含在损害诉讼指令中的赔偿目标。此外,
更新日期:2016-11-11
中文翻译:
应急费用对集体反垄断行动的影响:立陶宛和波兰的实验
应急费用协议是一种(如果不是唯一的)工具,可用于确保听取小额集体反垄断诉讼的意见,但它们受到欧盟的强烈抵制。正如在美国所看到的那样,有人担心应急费用可能会导致系统滥用或利益冲突。与欧盟政策相反,两个积极进取的成员国——立陶宛和波兰——引入了在集体诉讼中使用应急费用的可能性,以促进集体诉讼。尽管有很大的潜力,但本文将证明,仅引入应急费用不会促进包含在损害诉讼指令中的赔偿目标。此外,