In many countries of Europe, including especially its Eastern part, in the 21st century judicial councils have replaced ministries of justice as the bodies that manage judicial careers and govern the judiciary. This model may enhance the autonomy of the judicial branch but also weaken its accountability and lead to judicial corporatism. One way to counter the negative trends is to enhance public accountability of judicial councils, by making the work of councils is open and visible. Not surprisingly, judicial reformers have made transparency into a key criterion for a successful judicial council, leading many countries to promote transparency in their judicial councils. This article evaluates this trend−by (1) providing cases studies of four judicial councils, those of Italy, Poland, Moldova, and Latvia; and (2) comparing the work of empowered judicial councils throughout Europe with regard to the openness of judicial disciplinary hearings and public sessions of judicial councils themselves. On this basis I argue that while legal requirements for transparency are becoming the norm, they do not necessarily make the work of judicial councils open, let alone produce public accountability. This outcome requires as well a genuine commitment of council members and staff to transparency arrangements, the cessation of resistance to such arrangements, and the provision of money and staff to support them.

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司法委员会工作的透明度：（东）欧国家的经验

在欧洲的许多国家，尤其是其东部，在 21 世纪，司法委员会取代了司法部，成为管理司法职业和司法机构的机构。这种模式可能会增强司法部门的自主权，但也会削弱其问责制并导致司法团体主义。应对负面趋势的一种方法是加强司法委员会的公共问责制，使委员会的工作公开可见。毫不奇怪，司法改革者将透明度作为司法委员会成功的关键标准，导致许多国家提高其司法委员会的透明度​​。本文通过 (1) 提供四个司法委员会的案例研究来评估这一趋势，这些委员会分别是意大利、波兰、摩尔多瓦和拉脱维亚；(2) 比较全欧洲授权司法委员会在司法纪律听证会和司法委员会公开会议的公开性方面的工作。在此基础上，我认为，虽然对透明度的法律要求正在成为规范，但它们并不一定会使司法委员会的工作公开，更不用说产生公共问责制了。这一结果还需要理事会成员和工作人员对透明度安排做出真正的承诺，停止对此类安排的抵制，并提供资金和人员来支持他们。它们不一定使司法委员会的工作公开化，更不用说产生公共问责制了。这一结果还需要理事会成员和工作人员对透明度安排做出真正的承诺，停止对此类安排的抵制，并提供资金和人员来支持他们。它们不一定使司法委员会的工作公开化，更不用说产生公共问责制了。这一结果还需要理事会成员和工作人员对透明度安排做出真正的承诺，停止对此类安排的抵制，并提供资金和人员来支持他们。