Critics of national injunctions are lining up. Attorney General Jeff Sessions labeled these injunctions “absurd” and “simply unsustainable.” Justice Clarence Thomas called them “legally and historically dubious,” while Justice Neil Gorsuch mockingly referred to them as “cosmic injunctions.” Scholars in leading law reviews have called for their demise. Critics argue that national injunctions encourage forum shopping, unfairly burden the federal government, and depart from the history of equity. They also claim that national injunctions contradict the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Mendoza to exempt the federal government from offensive nonmutual issue preclusion—a doctrine that permits nonparties to benefit from a prior finding against a party from an earlier case. Critics are right to identify the connection between national injunctions and nonmutual preclusion. Both of these doctrines describe when judgments can benefit nonparties. But critics are wrong to see Mendoza as an argument against national injunctions. For one thing, the rise of nonmutual preclusion that prompted Mendoza undercuts crucial arguments against national injunctions by offering an alternative explanation for the absence of analogous injunctions in the history of equity. For another, Mendoza was not preordained; instead, it was a highly policy-driven decision. And Mendoza’s policy arguments were dubious when it was decided and even more dubious today. Scrutinizing these arguments should make us less comfortable in extending Mendoza to a new context—as the Supreme Court may be poised to do. Indeed, this Article goes one step further. The Supreme Court or Congress should take advantage of the attention on nonparty relief to reconsider, and overrule, Mendoza. Federal-government litigants do not deserve special treatment with respect to preclusion in every case, and the existing rules of preclusion adequately protect the interests purportedly at stake in Mendoza. Moreover, rejecting Mendoza has feedback effects for the national-injunctions debate. Overruling Mendoza would not only reduce the need for national injunctions (because preclusion could do some of the work) but also provide a framework for limiting national injunctions without eliminating them completely. This is especially important given recent decisions that make relying on class actions a tenuous response. More generally, overruling Mendoza would create a system that is fairer to governmental and nongovernmental litigants alike while reaffirming each branch’s role in the making of national policy.

中文翻译：

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国家禁令和排除

国家禁令的批评者正在排队。司法部长杰夫塞申斯将这些禁令称为“荒谬”和“根本不可持续”。克拉伦斯·托马斯大法官称它们“在法律上和历史上都是可疑的”，而尼尔·戈萨奇大法官则嘲笑地将它们称为“宇宙禁令”。领导法律评论的学者呼吁他们消亡。批评者认为，国家禁令鼓励论坛购物，给联邦政府带来不公平的负担，并背离了公平的历史。他们还声称，国家禁令与最高法院在美国诉门多萨案中的裁决相矛盾，该裁决使联邦政府免于攻击性的非相互问题排除——这一原则允许非当事人受益于先前案件中针对一方的先前调查结果。批评家认为国家禁令与非相互排斥之间的联系是正确的。这两个学说都描述了判断何时可以使非当事人受益。但批评者将门多萨视为反对国家禁令的论据是错误的。一方面，促使门多萨出现的非相互排斥的兴起削弱了反对国家禁令的关键论点，为公平史上没有类似禁令提供了另一种解释。另一方面，门多萨并不是命中注定的。相反，这是一个高度受政策驱动的决定。门多萨的政策论点在决定时是可疑的，今天更加可疑。仔细审查这些论点应该会让我们不太舒服地将门多萨扩展到一个新的背景——最高法院可能准备这样做。事实上，本文更进了一步。最高法院或国会应利用对非党派救济的关注来重新考虑并否决门多萨。联邦政府的诉讼当事人在每个案件中都不应该在排除方面得到特殊待遇，现有的排除规则充分保护了门多萨据称处于危险之中的利益。此外，拒绝门多萨对国家禁令辩论具有反馈效应。否决门多萨不仅会减少对国家禁令的需求（因为排除可以做一些工作），而且还提供一个框架来限制国家禁令而不完全消除它们。鉴于最近的决定使依赖集体诉讼成为一种脆弱的反应，这一点尤其重要。更普遍，