Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of country-level corruption and firms’ anti-bribery policies on analyst coverage. Analyst coverage has been identified as a powerful tool to detect fraud and should equally act as a possible tool to reduce corruption. Design/methodology/approach This study used a negative binomial count regression method on a longitudinal data set of a sample of S&P Global 1200 companies for the years 2010-2015. To control for potential endogeneity bias and improve the reliability of the estimation, both country-level corruption and firms’ anti-bribery policies variables were instrumented. Findings After controlling potential endogeneity bias, the results show that the adoption of anti-bribery policies at firm level attracts more analysts to follow a firm. The results for corruption at country level show that analyst coverage increases in less corrupted countries indicating that the costs of corruption exceed its potential benefits. When the variables corruption at country level and anti-bribery policies are interacted, the relationship is positive and highly significant. Practical implications Given the potential important role played by anti-corruption measures, firms are encouraged to adopt them to reduce the incidence of corruption and to increase analyst coverage, which will reinforce the benign effect of monitoring. Originality/value Although the literature on corruption at the country level is rich, it is geared towards the determinants of corruption in contrast to its consequences, and fewer studies have focused on the impact of corruption at firm level because of data limitations. This paper addresses this gap and contributes to the literature on the consequences of corruption at firm level.

中文翻译：

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腐败对分析师范围的影响

目的本研究旨在调查国家/地区级腐败和公司的反贿赂政策对分析师覆盖率的影响。分析师的报道被认为是检测欺诈行为的有力工具，并且同样应作为减少腐败的可能工具。设计/方法/方法本研究对2010-2015年间S＆P Global 1200家公司的样本的纵向数据集使用负二项式计数回归方法。为了控制潜在的内生性偏差并提高估计的可靠性，对国家级腐败和企业的反贿赂政策变量进行了分析。结果在控制了潜在的内生性偏见之后，结果表明，在公司层面采用反贿赂政策吸引了更多的分析家关注公司。国家一级的腐败结果表明，腐败程度较低的国家/地区的分析师覆盖率有所提高，这表明腐败的成本超过了其潜在利益。当国家层面的腐败变数和反贿赂政策的变量相互作用时，这种关系是积极的并且非常重要。实际意义鉴于反腐败措施可能发挥重要作用，因此鼓励公司采用这些措施以减少腐败发生率并增加分析师的覆盖范围，这将加强监督的良性效果。原创性/价值尽管有关国家层面腐败的文献很多，但与后果相比，它更适合于腐败的决定因素，并且由于数据的限制，很少有研究关注企业层面腐败的影响。