This paper aims to analyze the effects of internal and external governance mechanisms on the performance and risk taking of banks from the Euro zone before and after the 2008 financial crisis.,To avoid macroeconomic problems and shocks and because of data availability, the authors select some countries of the Euro zone, namely, France, Belgium, Germany and Finland, during the 2004-2009 period. These countries share similar macroeconomic environments (unemployment, inflation and economic growth rates). All the data relating to the banks are manually drawn from the supervising reports submitted to banks and are available on the banks’ websites and/or on that of the AMF website. The banks included in our sample are drawn from the list of European central banks on www.ecb.int,The empirical results show that banks undertake tradeoffs between different governance mechanisms to alleviate the intensity of the agency conflicts between the shareholders and managers. The findings also confirm that internal mechanisms and capital regulations are complementary and significantly impact bank performance.,This analysis can be extended through studying the interaction between bondholders’ governance and shareholders’ governance and their impact on the 2008 financial crisis.,The changes in banking governance help banks find a useful and necessary way to avoid ill-considered risks that can cause a systemic risk. Therefore, some conditions should be met so that banking governance can contribute to the economic development.,Culture and mentality of good banking governance must grow as much as possible through awareness-raising, training, promotion, recognition of performance, enhancing procedure transparency and stability of good banking governance and regulations, strengthening the national capacity to fight against corruption, and preventive mechanisms.,This paper complements previous studies, mainly those of Andres and Vallelado (2008) who examine the impact of the components of the board on banking performance and of Laeven and Levine (2009) who estimate the combined effect of regulatory and ownership structure on the risk-taking of each bank.

中文翻译：

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公司治理，欧洲银行业绩与金融危机

本文旨在分析内部和外部治理机制对2008年金融危机前后欧元区银行绩效和风险承担的影响。为避免宏观经济问题和冲击以及由于数据可得性，作者选择了一些2004年至2009年期间，欧元区的其他国家，即法国，比利时，德国和芬兰。这些国家有着相似的宏观经济环境（失业，通货膨胀和经济增长率）。与银行有关的所有数据都是从提交给银行的监管报告中手动提取的，可以在银行的网站和/或AMF网站上获得。我们样本中包含的银行均来自www.ecb.int上的欧洲中央银行列表，实证结果表明，银行在不同的治理机制之间进行权衡，以减轻股东与经理之间代理冲突的强度。研究结果还证实，内部机制和资本法规是相辅相成的，并且会显着影响银行的绩效。通过研究债券持有人的治理与股东治理之间的相互作用以及它们对2008年金融危机的影响，可以扩展这一分析。治理可帮助银行找到一种有用且必要的方式来避免可能引起系统性风险的不良风险。因此，应该满足一些条件，以便银行治理可以为经济发展做出贡献。良好的银行治理的文化和心态必须通过提高认识，