Many markets are syndicated, including those for initial public offerings, club deal leveraged buyouts, and debt issuances; in such markets, each winning bidder invites competitors to join a syndicate to complete production. We show that in syndicated markets, collusion may become easier as market concentration falls and market entry may facilitate collusion. In particular, firms can sustain collusion by refusing to syndicate with any firm that undercuts the collusive price, thereby raising that firm’s production costs. Our results can thus rationalize the paradoxical empirical observations that many real-world syndicated markets exhibit seemingly collusive pricing despite low levels of market concentration.

中文翻译：

---

与辛迪加在市场上勾结

许多市场都是银团，包括首次公开募股、俱乐部交易杠杆收购和债券发行；在这样的市场中，每个中标者都会邀请竞争者加入一个辛迪加来完成生产。我们表明，在辛迪加市场中，随着市场集中度的下降，合谋可能会变得更容易，而市场进入可能会促进合谋。特别是，企业可以通过拒绝与任何降低合谋价格的企业联合来维持合谋，从而提高该企业的生产成本。因此，我们的结果可以合理化自相矛盾的经验观察，即尽管市场集中度较低，但许多现实世界的银团市场仍表现出看似合谋的定价。