Although an auction of drilling rights is often cited as an example of common values, formal evidence has been limited by the problem of auction-level unobserved heterogeneity. We develop an empirical approach for first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous bidder entry. We show that important features of the model are nonparametrically identified and apply a semiparametric estimation approach to data from US offshore oil and gas lease auctions. We find that common values, affiliated private information, and unobserved heterogeneity are all present. Failing to account for unobserved heterogeneity obscures the evidence of common values. We examine implications of our estimates for the interaction between affiliation, the winner’s curse, the auction rules, and the number of bidders in determining the aggressiveness of bidding and seller revenue.

中文翻译：

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美国海上石油租赁拍卖中的共同价值、未观察到的异质性和内生进入

尽管钻井权的拍卖经常被引用作为共同价值的一个例子，但正式证据一直受到拍卖层面未观察到的异质性问题的限制。我们为具有关联价值、未观察到的异质性和内生投标人进入的首价密封投标拍卖开发了一种经验方法。我们表明该模型的重要特征是非参数识别的，并将半参数估计方法应用于美国海上石油和天然气租赁拍卖的数据。我们发现共同的价值观、关联的私人信息和未观察到的异质性都存在。未能解释未观察到的异质性会掩盖共同价值观的证据。我们研究了我们的估计对从属关系、赢家的诅咒、拍卖规则、