Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

中文翻译：

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信息设计：统一视角

修正具有不确定收益的游戏，信息设计可以识别信息结构和均衡，从而最大化信息设计者的收益。我们展示了这种观点如何统一现有的工作，包括游戏中的交流（Myerson（1991）），贝叶斯说服力（Kamenica和Gentzkow（2011））以及我们自己最近的一些工作。信息设计有一个字面的解释，在这个解释下，有一个真正的信息设计者可以致力于为一组游戏参与者选择最佳的信息结构（从她的角度来看）。我们强调一种隐喻性的解释，在这种解释下，分析师使用信息设计问题来表征许多不同信息结构下的游戏玩法。