We provide an introduction to the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design, with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well-known Vickrey–Clark–Groves and D'Aspremont–Gerard–Varet mechanisms to a dynamic environment. Second, we discuss revenue optimal mechanisms. We cover models of sequential screening and revenue-maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agents' types. Third, we consider models with changing populations of agents over time. After discussing related models with risk-averse agents and limited liability, we conclude with a number of open questions and challenges that remain for the theory of dynamic mechanism design.

中文翻译：

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动态机制设计：简介

我们将介绍动态机构设计的最新发展，主要关注准线性情况。首先，我们描述了社会上最优的（或有效的）动态机制。这些机制将著名的Vickrey–Clark–Groves和D'Aspremont–Gerard–Varet机制扩展到动态环境。其次，我们讨论收益最佳机制。我们涵盖了具有动态变化的投标者类型的顺序筛选和收益最大化拍卖的模型。我们还将讨论信息管理模型，其中机制设计者可以控制（至少部分地）控制代理类型的随机过程。第三，我们考虑随着时间的推移代理群体不断变化的模型。在与规避风险的代理人和有限责任公司讨论了相关模型之后，