Abstract I will argue that Frege’s puzzle arises only in taking into consideration the cognizer’s viewpoint. Although this sounds trivial, it triggers some important consequences. In particular, Frege’s puzzle has nothing to do with the notion of identity. For, the puzzle rests on whether the speaker/hearer (or writer/reader) conceives the names flanking the identity-sign to be co-referential or not (independently of whether they are de facto co-referential). I will show how Frege’s attempted solution in the Begriffsschrift can be rescued and how this may not conflict with the solution Frege proposes in introducing the sense/reference distinction. To do so, though, we should recognize that Frege worked with different (and somewhat conflicting) notions of content and that he assumed that only a single content expressed by an utterance should encompass all the information conveyed by a statement. In questioning this assumption Frege’s puzzle or a Frege-inspired puzzle can be addressed and understood from a different perspective.

中文翻译：

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身份，十二进制共索引和弗雷格之谜

摘要我将争辩说，弗雷格的难题仅是在考虑了认知者的观点之后才出现的。尽管这听起来微不足道，但却引发了一些重要的后果。尤其是，弗雷格的难题与身份概念无关。因为，困惑在于说话者/听者（或作家/阅读者）是否认为侧翼于身份标志的名称是共同引用的（独立于它们是否实际上是共同引用的）。我将展示如何挽救弗雷格在Begriffsschrift中尝试的解决方案，以及这如何与弗雷格在引入意义/指称区别时提出的解决方案不冲突。为此，我们应该认识到，弗雷格使用了不同的（并且在某种程度上是相互冲突的）内容概念，并且他认为，只有一种用言语表达的内容应该包含陈述所传达的所有信息。在质疑这个假设时，可以从不同的角度来解决和理解弗雷格难题或弗雷格启发难题。