We estimate the effects of the minimum wage on women’s intrahousehold bargaining power in Indonesia. Using province-specific minimum wage increases in Indonesia from 20002014 and a sample of married household heads and their spouses from a panel of Indonesian households, we implement a method that exploits differences in minimum wages between geographically proximate districts located near the border between separate provinces. We exploit survey responses regarding participation in household decisions as a proxy for bargaining power. We find that the minimum wage has a negative and statistically and economically significant effect on married women’s bargaining power. We provide evidence that this negative effect is due to a relative improvement in labor market opportunities for married men compared to their wives in response to a minimum wage increase. Consistent with this explanation we find large negative effects of the minimum wage on bargaining power for households where the wife is less educated and positive effects for households where the wife is more educated. We show that these results are robust to various specification choices.

中文翻译：

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最低工资和妇女在家庭中的决策权：来自印度尼西亚的证据

我们估计了最低工资对印度尼西亚女性家庭内部议价能力的影响。使用印度尼西亚自 20002014 年以来特定省份的最低工资增长以及来自印度尼西亚家庭小组的已婚户主及其配偶的样本，我们实施了一种方法，该方法利用位于不同省份之间边界附近的地理邻近地区之间的最低工资差异。我们利用关于参与家庭决策的调查反馈作为议价能力的代理。我们发现最低工资对已婚妇女的议价能力有负面的、统计上和经济上显着的影响。我们提供的证据表明，这种负面影响是由于已婚男性与妻子相比，由于最低工资增加，劳动力市场机会相对改善。与这种解释一致，我们发现最低工资对妻子受教育程度较低的家庭的议价能力有很大的负面影响，而对妻子受教育程度较高的家庭则有积极的影响。我们表明这些结果对各种规格选择都是稳健的。