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Selfish Bureaucrats and Policy Heterogeneity in Nordhaus' dice
Climate Change Economics ( IF 1.341 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-09 , DOI: 10.1142/s2010007820400060
RICHARD S. J. TOL 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Affiliation  

Nordhaus’ seminal DICE model assesses first-best climate policy, a useful but unrealistic yardstick. I propose a measure of policy inefficacy if carbon prices are heterogeneous and use observed prices to recalibrate the DICE model. I introduce a model of climate policy with selfish bureaucrats, and calibrate it to carbon dioxide emissions in the European Union and the policy models used by the IPCC. This model also implies a measure of policy inefficacy that I use to recalibrate DICE. The global mean temperature is 1 perhaps 2 degrees Celsius higher in the recalibrated than in the original DICE model.

中文翻译:

诺德豪斯骰子中的自私官僚和政策异质性

Nordhaus开创性的DICE模型评估了最佳的气候政策,这是一个有用但不切实际的准绳。如果碳价异质,我建议采取一种政策无效的措施,并使用观察到的价格重新校准DICE模型。我介绍了一个自私的官僚们的气候政策模型,并将其校准为欧盟的二氧化碳排放量以及IPCC使用的政策模型。该模型还暗示了我用来重新校准DICE的政策无效性的一种度量。重新校准后的全球平均温度比原始DICE模型高1摄氏度或2摄氏度。
更新日期:2020-09-09
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