This article examines money market funds and the regulation that was promulgated in the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy during the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. Various explanations for the ensuing run-like behavior are discussed, including a first-mover advantage related to potential fire sales, the ability to redeem shares at a stable $1.00 when funds are valued below $1.00, and flights to quality and transparency. We then discuss regulatory reform, beginning with the SEC's 2010 amendments and concluding with its 2014 Money Market Fund Reform rules, which require (a) all funds to implement liquidity fees and redemption gates and (b) institutional prime funds to price at their floating net asset value. The economic underpinnings of the SEC's final policy choices are discussed and compared to alternatives, such as capital buffers, that were considered but not adopted.

中文翻译：

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货币市场基金与监管

本文研究了货币市场基金及其在2007年和2008年金融危机期间雷曼兄弟破产后颁布的法规。对随之而来的类似游走行为的各种解释进行了讨论，包括与潜在的先发优势相关的信息。进行抛售，在资金价值低于1.00美元时以稳定的1.00美元赎回股票的能力，以及提高质量和透明度的机会。然后，我们将讨论监管改革，首先是SEC的2010年修正案，最后是其2014年货币市场基金改革规则，该规则要求（a）所有基金都必须实施流动性费用和赎回门，并且（b）机构主要基金必须以其浮动净额定价资产值。讨论了SEC最终政策选择的经济基础，并将其与其他选择进行了比较，