A seller bargains with a rationally inattentive buyer (Sims 2003) over a good of random quality. After observing quality, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The buyer pays attention to the seller's product and offer at a cost proportional to expected entropy reduction. Because attention is free off-path, multiple equilibria emerge, many of which are efficient. A trembling-hand-like refinement (Selten 1975) rules out efficiency, delivering complete disagreement when attention is expensive and a unique equilibrium with trade when attention is cheap. In this equilibrium, the buyer overpays for low-quality goods, underpays for high-quality goods, and earns a strictly positive payoff.

中文翻译：

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最后通Bar讨价还价，注意力不集中

卖方与随机购买的产品在价格上与理性的购买者讨价还价（Sims，2003年）。观察质量后，卖方提出接受或保留的要约。买方关注卖方的产品，并以与预期的熵降低成正比的成本进行报价。由于注意力不受束缚，因此出现了多个平衡点，其中许多平衡点都是有效的。颤抖之类的提炼（Selten 1975）排除了效率，当注意力集中时，完全无法达成共识，而注意力廉价时，则与贸易形成独特的平衡。在这种平衡下，购买者为低品质商品多付了钱，为优质商品少付了钱，并获得了严格的正收益。