Over the last 15 years, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and full benefits from exchange can be realized only if they do. We propose incentivizing compatible pairs to participate in exchange by insuring their patients against future renal failure via increased priority in deceased-donor queue. We analyze equity and welfare benefits of this scheme through a new dynamic continuum model. We calibrate the model with US data and quantify substantial gains from adopting incentivized exchange, both in terms of access to living-donor transplants and reduced competition for deceased-donor transplants.

中文翻译：

---

激励性肾脏交换

在过去的15年中，肾脏交换已成为增加移植的主流范例。但是，兼容的对不参与，并且只有它们兼容，才能从交换中获得全部收益。我们建议通过增加已故捐助者队列中的优先级来确保患者对未来的肾衰竭的保护，从而鼓励兼容的配对参与交流。我们通过新的动态连续模型分析了该计划的公平和福利收益。我们使用美国数据对模型进行了校准，并通过采用激励性交换来量化从获取活体供体移植和减少对已故供体移植的竞争方面获得的实质性收益。